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WAR CRIMES
ROBERT DONIHI*

In 1945, following the World War II surrenders of Germany
and Japan, I travelled to Tokyo as an assistant U.S. civilian prosecutor employed by the Justice and War Departments to bring top
Japanese war crimes perpetrators to trial. In December 1946, after
completing my work before the eleven-nation International Military Tribunal for the Far East ("IMTFE"),1 I proceeded to Germany where I became a Chief Trial Attorney prosecuting and defending cases before U.S. War Crimes Tribunals established by the
U.S. Army at the Dachau Concentration Camp.
To my knowledge, I am the only U.S. civilian attorney who
has tried war crimes cases in both Japan and Germany. The fourpower International Military Tribunal ("IMT") at Nuremberg2
had completed its one and only trial in 1945, prior to my arrival in
Germany. Goering had committed suicide; the other condemned
had been hanged.3 Those acquitted were free. The seven given
term sentences,' including lifer Rudolf Hess, were incarcerated as
* L.L.B. 1938, Cumberland University; J.D. 1940, Samford University School of Law;
1941-45, associate and member of the firm Daniel, Miles & Donihi; 1945, prosecutor for the
United States in the eleven-nation International Tribunal of the Far East; 1946, prosecutor
and defense attorney in European War Crimes Commission proceedings. Since 1948, Mr.
Donihi has held numerous positions in the government and private sectors. Presently, he
practices law and conducts foreign-affairs seminars.
I See PHILIP R. PICCIGALLo, THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLIED WAR CRIMES OPERATIONS
IN THE EAST 1945-1951, xii-xiii (1979). The eleven participating prosecution countries were
the United States, Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, China, the Philippines, France,
Russia, Canada, New Zealand, and India. Id.
2 The International Military Tribunal ("IMT") was established for the trial of Nazi
leaders guilty of alleged war crimes. BRADLEY F. SMITH, THE ROAD TO NUREMBERG 3 (1981).
The IMT at Nuremberg consisted of the four Allied powers: the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. Id. at 4. Never before had a group of victorious powers
established an international tribunal to prosecute their defeated enemies for alleged violations of criminal law. Id. at 3.
3 See AianY NEAVE, ON TRIAL AT NUREMBERG 310-11 (1979). Goering, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Hans Frank, Streicher, Sauckel, Jodl, Kaltenbrunner, Rosenburg, Frick, and Seyss-Inquart were sentenced to death by hanging by the IMT. Id. Goering bit a phial of potassium
cyanide and died before he could be hanged. Id. at 312.
' Hess, Speer, Von Neurath, Von Schirach, Doenitz, Funk, and Raeder were sentenced
to between ten years and life in prison. Id. at 331.
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the only convicts in the lonely four-power prison fortress of Span-

dau in the British-occupied sector of Berlin. The seven infamous
and theretofore inaccessible remnants of the Nazi hierarchy were
guarded on monthly rotation by the four Allied Powers.
Nuremberg had become unilateral with the departure of the
French, British, and Soviet judges and prosecutors. U.S. Chief
Prosecutor and Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson,5 along
with U.S. Nuremberg Judge Francis Biddle, had also gone home,
leaving the Palace of Justice6 unilaterally in U.S. Military hands
under Brigadier General Telford Taylor.7
Mr. Justice Jackson, more than any other single American,
and perhaps more than any other person in the world (considering
that it was the U.S. leadership which advanced the concept of international agreements at the expense of traditional U.S. constitutional government procedures), is responsible for the subsequent
harm to our system of laws. His own defense of the Nuremberg
Charter" has a hollow though idealistic resonance. In the preface of
his official February 1949 report as United States Representative
to the Nuremberg Trials, as quoted by Professor John Norton
Moore's leading paragraph to his remarks made March 13, 1991
before the Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and
Refugees of the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary,9 Mr. Jus-

I

See ANN TUSA & JOHN TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 68-90 (1983) (discussing Justice
Jackson).
8 See NEAVE, supra note 3, at 42-49. The Palace of Justice was a solid municipal building in which Nazi war criminals were detained and later tried. Id. at 45. The Palace was
guarded by five Sherman tanks armed with 76mm guns and American soldiers crouched
behind sand bags. Id.
I FRANK M. BUSCHER, THE U.S. WAR CRIMES TRIAL PROGRAM IN GERMANY, 1946-1955, at
31 (1989). After the proceeding held by the IMT, the United States continued to unilaterally prosecute war criminals under the direction of Brigadier General Telford Taylor. Id.
See generally TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRLALs: A PERSONAL
MEMOIR 611 (1992).
In this writer's opinion, Mr. Justice Jackson should neither have been asked nor should
he have accepted the President's request to prosecute a category of cases that would obviously and ultimately require some decisions by United States courts, including the Supreme
Court.
" See TuSA & TuSA, supra note 5, at 85-90 (discussing Nuremberg Charter generally).
The Charter was a document which set out the composition, jurisdiction, powers, and procedure of the Tribunal. Id. at 85. The Charter outlined the three crimes that defendants could
be charged with: (1) "Crimes against Peace," (2) "War Crimes," and (3) "Crimes against
Humanity." Id. at 86-87; see also TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 167 (quoting Justice Jackson in
his opening statement at the Nuremberg trials).
' See John Norton Moore, War Crimes and the Rule of Law in the Gulf Crisis, 31 VA.
J. INT'L L. 403 (1991).
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tice Jackson reportedly said:
The principles of the charter [at the Nuremberg Trials], no less
than its wide acceptance, establish its significance as a step in the
evolution of a law-governed society of nations....
...

If the nations which command the great physical forces of

the world want the society of nations to be governed by law, these
principles may contribute to that end. If those who have the
power of decision revert to the concept of unlimited and irresponsible sovereignty, neither this nor any charter will save the world
from international lawlessness."0
Could Mr. Justice Jackson have had the United States in
mind with the description "unlimited and irresponsible sovereignty?" I hope not. More importantly, his negative use of the
words "if" and "may" bespeak his own doubts as to the efficacy of
the "Nuremberg Precedents"" as a deterrent to "international
lawlessness."
Turning to Mr. Moore's remarks, he makes an excellent argument for "new thinking" pertaining to reasons for holding war
crimes trials for "the Gulf crisis [and] .

.

. Iraqi violations of the

behavior"' 12

basic norms of civilized
and for procedures in connection with such potential trials. Mr. Moore discloses the weakness of
the present law and policy regarding jurisdiction over present-day
war crimes in his concluding paragraph:
If we are serious about the important humanitarian and environmental standards embodied in the laws of war, do we not have
responsibility to hold accountable those who commit grave
breaches of these laws? Is it not important to live up to our existing international legal obligations under the Third and Fourth
Geneva Conventions to seek out and either try or extradite those
alleged to have committed grave breaches of these important
10 Id.; see also Frank Lawrence, The Nuremberg Principles:A Defense for Political
Protesters,40 HASTINGS L.J. 397-98 (1989) (Nuremberg principles codified as international
law with offenses outlined in the Nuremberg Charter); TUSA & TUSA, supra note 5, at 87
("The denial of the defence of superior orders has often been called the 'Nuremberg
Principle'.").
"1See William V. O'Brien, The Nuremberg Precedent and the Gulf War, 31 VA. J.
INT'L L. 391, 391 (1991). The precedent established by the Nuremberg trails was that of
command responsibility. Under this principle, military leaders are subject to prosecution for
crimes committed by their units or within their jurisdiction, despite lack of proof that the
leader ordered such action. It is sufficient that a responsible commander knew or should
have known about the illegal action and did not take reasonable preventative and disciplinary actions. Id. at 391-92.
12 Moore, supra note 9, at 404.
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Conventions? And if we seek peace more broadly, is it not important that we seek to add deterrence at a more personal level to
the regime elites actually engaged in planning and ordering aggressive war and brutal war crimes?" 13
My response to Mr. Moore's above expressed thinking is a resounding "yes." Saddam Hussein and, possibly, many others in the
world should be accountable for their criminal acts in warfare. Furthermore, Mr. Moore was certainly addressing his thoughts to the
right forum in the United States-the Congress. Congress can ensure that there will someday be "constitutionally" enacted legislation making it mandatory to proceed against modern-day war
crimes perpetrators. The weakness is that we have no mandatory
"rule of law," despite the Geneva Conventions1 4 and past legal
"precedents." The deplorable truth is that there will be no proper
history-that is, no judicial record-of war crimes which go untried. Iraq, as a signatory Nation to the Geneva Conventions,
should be held accountable for violations committed by Iraqi rep15
resentatives during the Gulf War.
Saddam Hussein's wanton disregard for law and order have
kept lively the prospect of another generation of war crimes trials.
Whether and how the United States can or will try Saddam Hussein and other known or suspected war crimes perpetrators is primarily a policy matter. There is no law which requires the President to convene a war crimes tribunal with jurisdiction to try cases
involving crimes committed against any of the coalition nations-their peace, property, citizens, or sovereignty-as a consequence of acts committed before, during, or following the Gulf
13 Id. at 409.

", See BERT V.A. ROLING, 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 580 (M. Cherif & Ved P.
Nanda eds., 1973). Of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the first three dealt with improving conditions of wounded and sick soldiers and treatment of prisoners of war; the
fourth addressed the safe-guarding of civilians in time of war. Id. Each Convention stipulated that states legislatively prohibit and proscribe punishment for: "(1) willful killing, (2)
torture or inhuman treatment including biological experiments, (3) willfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or health, and (4) extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly." Id.
15 See Moore, supra note 9, at 404 (noting five reasons for prosecutions of Iraqi "violations of the basic norms of civilized behavior"); see also TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 637 (discussing reasons why Iraq should be held responsible for its war crimes). Concerning the
Persian Gulf War, President Bush relied principally on the argument that international law
forbids aggressive wars and that such gross and dangerous violations could not be tolerated.
Id.
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War. This absence exists despite the international war crimes trials
and precedents at Nuremberg and Tokyo following World War II.
President Bush's attitudes vis-a-vis Saddam Hussein are a
matter of public record. Judicial notice can be taken of his desire
to have Iraq change its government. Competent experts are working on a method which the President can support as a means to
encourage that change. 6 Likely, he or the next President will act
according to his best judgment as guided by top advisers, especially the Secretaries of State and Defense, and, hopefully, by
members of Congress-particularly those charged with committee
responsibility in foreign affairs and foreign relations.
Nevertheless, it will still remain a matter of policy for the
President to determine how and when to act if any war crimes tribunal is to be established with the United States as a participant."7
He may, if he chooses, ignore the "Nuremberg Precedent" of trials
by international executive agreement. 8 He could and should, I believe, seek Senate participation through ratification of an appropriate treaty which would order establishment of war crimes tribunals
in concert with other nations.
But how do I personally feel about the potential use of the
"Nuremberg Precedent"? Quite comfortable; war crimes perpetrators must be brought to justice ... there needs to be a record... a
judicial record of their crimes and punishments. Otherwise, international villains and heroes become near indistinguishable. The
lines between right and wrong erode and the common desire for
peace becomes unenforceable. Should Saddam be tried if his peers,
Gulf neighbors, concur? Of course! He certainly can be tried, if
only for his violations of the Geneva Conventions (possibly in absentia under the original Nuremberg Precedent).
The term "Nuremberg Precedent," as loosely and popularly
used in the United States, refers to the international trials of German, Japanese and Italian war criminals by the Allies following
World War II. ' In point of fact, the number of so-called "international" war crimes tribunals involving U.S. personnel exclusively *as
" See W. Hays Parks, War Crimes in the Gulf War, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 773 (1992).
17 Cf. Paul Lewis, U.N. Sets Up War-Crimes Panel on Charges of Balkan Atrocities,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1991, at Al (discussing President's recent proposal to establish a United
Nations commission to investigate crimes against humanity in Balkans).
18 Cf. id. The President chose to follow the "Nuremberg Precedent" in his proposal to
investigate crimes against humanity in the Balkans. Id.
19 See supra notes 8, 10-11 and accompanying text (discussing Nuremberg Charter,
Principles, and Precedent). See generally TAYLOR, supra note 7.
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prosecutors and judges number no less than fourteen.2 0 There were
only two bona fide or de facto "international" trials regarding the
judges and prosecutors. In other words, fourteen of sixteen "international" cases were prosecuted and judged solely by U.S. citizens.
First among the sixteen was the trial in the Philippines of Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita by an all-American, five officer, U.S. military commission established on the authority of U.S.
General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander of the
Allied Powers ("SCAP"). 2 1 Brought to trial on October 29, 1945,
Yamashita was sentenced to death on December 7, the anniversary
of Pearl Harbor, 22 an appropriate punishment considering the
proof of rape, murder, pillage, and torture committed by
Yamashita's troops. It seems to have been the first (certainly the
first post-World War II) war-crimes trial in which a commanding
officer was held criminally accountable for the failure to control his
troops.2 3 This issue has remained controversial. The concept of
command responsibility, which led to Yamashita's execution in
February 1946, put in motion an argument that could hold U.S.
Presidents and their commanding generals subject to trial under
the "Nuremberg Precedent" for violations of the law of war committed by their subordinates. This thought was advanced by U.S.
General Telford Taylor, chief prosecutor of the twelve Nuremberg
"Subsequent Proceedings" and author of the book Nuremberg and
Vietnam: An American Tragedy. 4
If Telford Taylor is correct, we can conclude that President
Bush, General Schwarzkopf, and General Powell, along with Secretary Cheney, might one day be brought to trial for applicable violations of the law of war committed by their subordinates during the
Gulf War. This statement seems to have a brassy and somewhat
ridiculous ring to it even as written.
Soon after the Yamashita trial in the Philippines, there was
20 See ADALBERT RUCKEREL, THE INVESTIGATIONS OF NAZI CRIMES 1945-78, 27, 27-28
(Derk Rutter trans., 1980) (listing thirteen American trials conducted in Germany and single trial conducted in Tokyo).
" See PICCIGALLO, supra note 1, at 49. For a thorough treatment of the Yamashita trial,
see generally RICHARD L. LAEL, THE YAMASHITA PRECEDENT: WAR CRIMES AND COMMAND RE-

SPONSIBILITY

(1982).

See PICCIGALLO, supra note 1, at 54. Yamashita was sentenced to death by hanging
after the commission findings were affirmed by a Military Review Board and General MacArthur. Id. at 54-55.
22 See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1945).
24 TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 52 (1970).
22
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another of like kind for Japanese General Masaharu Homma, commander of the troops who forced U.S. and Filipino POWs into the
infamous Bataan Death March.2 5 This case, too, was tried under
color of International authority by Americans.2" The other twelve
cases calling themselves "international" but, in fact, being U.S. war
crimes tribunals under color of international precedents and executive agreements were the "Subsequent Proceedings" 7presided over
by Brigadier General Telford Taylor at Nuremberg.1
The Tokyo Trial
From the air, Japan's Atsugi airport had been invisible to the
human eye on the night of December 8, 1945 (December 7 at Pearl
Harbor) as we prepared to land in the Secretary of State's aircraft
"The Statesman." It was four years to the day since the Japanese
had struck our military forces in Hawaii. On President Truman's
orders sixteen U.S. prosecution lawyers had departed Washington
on the morning of December 4. We were to investigate, interrogate,
indict, and try the top Japanese leaders responsible for war crimes
before, during, and following the U.S. declaration of war against
Japan. Later we would be joined by prosecution teams from England, Northern Ireland, France, the Netherlands, Canada, China,
India, the U.S.S.R., Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines
(which became a nation on July 4, 1945), forming what was known
as the International Prosecution Section ("IPS-Tokyo").
Weary from the long, island-hopping trip from Hawaii, it was
not comforting to learn from the crew that bomb-craters on the
ground would make landing hazardous. However, we made it without incident and were immediately issued holstered and loaded
"45s"; for what purpose, I do not know-it did make me nervous to
speculate.
Departure for Tokyo, some miles away, was immediate. The
few Japanese we saw en route seemed friendly, curious, and
unafraid. For the first night, we were distributed between the posh
Imperial Hotel and the Dai Iti (number one) Hotel. The next
morning we met with General Douglas MacArthur, who surprised
me by being considerably shorter (without his cap) than I had an25 See PICCIGALLO, supra note 1, at 63.
216See id. at 64. The prosecutors and defense attorneys for Homma were all Americans.

Id.

27

See BuscHER, supra note 7. at 31; TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 611.
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ticipated. Nevertheless, as the General walked around our circle to
greet us, he seemed to grow rapidly and mysteriously taller. 28
Following the meeting, we departed for our temporary offices
in the Mejii building, where initial work assignments were distributed. At the top of the agenda was the collection arid assembling of
lists of the most likely suspects for further investigation and
interrogation.
My assignments came at once: first, to serve as liaison to the
U.S. State Department and to U.S. Foreign Service personnel to
obtain all available information about the Japanese most likely to
be questioned by us. This resulted in enough names to fill the dock
several times over. The Army Intelligence Office furnished another
such list. John Darsey, an Assistant U.S. Attorney General, had
the Justice Department list.
Although Emperor Hirohito was foremost in our minds, I do
not recall seeing his name on any of the U.S. lists and never saw
any lists from other nations. It seemed, however, that at that time
there was unanimous, although uneasy, agreement at the prosecution level of all the nations to exclude the Emperor from consideration. This could only be the result of governmental agreement
pursuant to U.S. insistence, in that it was our troops and money
which made the occupation possible.29
The U.S. prosecution team was star-crossed from the outset.
Even as the original selections were being made there was a leadership rift. Assistant Attorney General John Darsey had been appointed by Attorney General Tom C. Clark to represent the Justice Department in staffing a U.S. contingent. Darsey and some
28 It was obvious that General MacArthur as the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers ("SCAP") and Mr. Keenan (yet to be designated by the allied prosecutors the Chief
of the International Prosecution Section) mutually admired each other. This was to both
assist and impede the highest purposes of our mission.
2 See PIcCIGALLO, supra note 1, at 16. In discussing the agreement not to prosecute the
Emperor, the author stated:
[The] strictly American decision [not to prosecute Hirohito] caused perhaps more
furor in Allied circles than any other relative to war crimes policy. Immediately
after Japan's surrender a multitude of demands that Hirohito be tried as a war
criminal inundated, often to the point of embarrassment, SCAP Headquarters and
Washington ....

That decision, originating at the highest governmental levels, harmonized "with
the course advised by United States experts on Japanese affairs" to Presidents
Roosevelt and Truman ....
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other Justice Department lawyers travelled to Nuremberg as observers, and then came back to complete arrangements for the Japanese trial. Darsey clearly hoped to head the mission to Japan, but
due to inadequate political clout his aspirations were undercut
with the selection by President Truman of Joseph B. Keenan,
known in Washington circles as a king-maker. Darsey was supported by Georgia's Senator Russell and Keenan was supported by
Senator McKellar.
Keenan, a Clevelander and Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Criminal Division at Justice, became famous in the
early Roosevelt years as the nation's number one gangbuster. It
was Keenan-not the "Untouchables"-who planned and supervised policy, bringing about the downfall of gangland. Keenan also
authored and guided through Congress the Lindberg anti-kidnapping laws, and was moved by Roosevelt to the White House as liaison to the Senate. It was Roosevelt who dubbed Keenan "Joe the
Key," as he did Tom Corcoran "Tommy the Cork."
With Roosevelt's friendship, Keenan was able to assist many
persons to attain high places in government. Keenan's own power
came from his special friendship with Tennessee's Senator Kenneth McKellar, Chairman of the powerful Senate Finance Committee and the key to the success of Roosevelt legislative proposals.
Darsey seemed baffled by the selection of Keenan to head the
U.S. delegation in the prosecution of top Japanese War Crimes
perpetrators. "[Keenan] was impossible with staff over here [in the
Justice Department]," Darsey told me. "He'll disrupt the organization out of habit." This prophesy proved true. But Keenan had
many friends in the highest places. The plan was for Keenan's national image and reputation to be highlighted to make him a viable
Democratic candidate for the Senate seat then held by Ohio's conservative Robert Taft. Taft was a foe of Roosevelt's social reforms.
When Tom Clark became Attorney General, he owed many debts
to Keenan, and Clark was in a position to recommend to President
Truman the selection of Keenan, per Roosevelt's rumored
intention.
Darsey wanted the legal staff to be selected from among Justice Department attorneys. With Keenan's concurrence, seven Justice trial lawyers, including Darsey, were chosen. Keenan selected
six senior lawyers from among his own private and governmental
friends. Only three were directly chosen by the Attorney General
from outside government: Elton Hyder, of Fort Worth, on the rec-
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ommendation of former Texas Governor, U.S. Federal Judge
James Allred, and me. Earlier, I had been asked whether I'd accept
an offer to go by the Attorney General after he had presented me
for admission to the Supreme Court. Later, I learned from Keenan
that he had also been requested to engage me by Senator
McKellar.
That completed the immediate trial team. "Project K," as we
were coded, was completed for departure on December 3. Until the
previous weekend, "Project K" had been cloaked in complete secrecy. At my final briefing and "processing" (shots, passport, etc.),
I had been warned against discussing anything about K's existence.
Thus, on a plane to Washington for the processing, I was seated
with fellow Nashvillian U.S. Army Captain Luke Lea Jr., who
asked about my trip and I about his. We each gave non-committal
answers. Likewise, on the return trip Lea was my traveling companion with similar questions and answers. On Sunday of that
week, our pictures appeared side-by-side in the Nashville Tennessean with a White House story concerning the presidential project.
Until the moment of departure, the consensus among us lawyers at the aircraft's ramp was that Hirohito was at the top of the
list for consideration for trial. A last minute press session at the
plane elicited a question about the Emperor. I recall Keenan's response, as he pointed towards the sky: "We'll decide when we
reach Japan whether to reach to the very top." As I looked at his
raised hand, I wondered if he was thinking of Hirohito as the alleged "Son of Heaven."
At that point, a White House limousine sped to a stop at the
plane and Keenan was handed an envelope evidently containing a
message about the Emperor. When we were aloft, I learned that we.
would not be permitted to interrogate any member of the Royal
household.30
In Tokyo, things moved rapidly for most of us. We had obtained the Imperial War Ministry Building as headquarters for the
prosecution, the defense, and, eventually, the trial. I had been assigned to handle the investigation, preparation, and, if recommended, the cases against Hirota and Araki. Tojo had been assigned exclusively to John Fihelly. The files of other persons to be
considered for trial were divided among the remaining lawyers to
investigate and make recommendations.
SO See id.
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While conducting assigned work, I decided to explore the media and propaganda censorship questions which plagued me. I
wondered how the Japanese leadership prepared the people for
war against the United States and other allies. An immediate result of this curiosity brought me 1.5 million linear feet of captured
Japanese propaganda and military film obtained from our intelligence sources. Fortunately, with professional help, I quickly found
one twelve-reel government film, "Japan in Crisis," which began
with Hirohito's regency, and traced the military and propaganda
buildup through the 1930s and immediately prior to Pearl Harbor.
The Emperor and other top government officials were depicted at
work "preparing."
That film now reposes in the National Archives in Washington
as part of the proof which I presented in court in the prosecution's
phase during "Preparation for War." We found it just in time.
Someone had told Keenan that the entire 1.5 million feet was
made of nitric acid and apt to remove the Chief Prosecutor, along
with the building, at the flash of a match. Keenan, never calm
when excited, flew into my office demanding the immediate removal of all film. Within hours it was gone. The twelve remaining
reels were transferred to safety film.
In the meantime, Keenan had been issued a large semi-western estate with several dwellings, all together known as Hattori
House, the home of one of Japan's wealthiest industrialists. It was
considered to be a special indication of approval to be invited to
live at Hattori House, and there was a particular significance in
being invited to live with Keenan. He used us as his policy-planning team. In the early days of preparation, we took our meals together at the house, usually in the main dining-room on a long
banquet table. Keenan seldom ate with us, being busy with his international colleagues. But he did call us together, especially the
nine lawyers in Hattori House, and engaged us in discussions relating to U.S. policy and planning and problems, as for example:
Which nations should be invited to participate? Keenan was personally against asking the Soviet Union. Should we make the trial
unilateral? Possibly taking to Honolulu those to be tried for murder arising out of the surprise attack? What jurisdictional questions needed to be considered? Should we recommend to the president that Unilateral International Trials be held in Tokyo using
only U.S. personnel in the prosecution and on the bench? To this
latter there was a resounding "no" from all present. Should we at-
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tempt to use our presidential power and the power of the other
nations to establish a prosecution and tribunal separate and apart
from the authority of MacArthur? On this point there was
indecision.
The "original" and only international Nuremberg trial was
conducted as a Military Tribunal. That seemed to influence Mr.
Keenan, who surrendered all of his authority to SCAP-General
MacArthur. From a personal point of view, he made the right
choice. From the perspective of history and the advancement of
international law, I thought he missed an exceptionally great opportunity to establish a precedent representing most of the people
of the world in a civilian war crimes court, represented as they
were on the IMTFE bench and prosecution team. But, so far as we
know, Keenan could have been acting under presidential orders to
give the reins to SCAP.
In the end, the title Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers was an empty one. As we may recall, MacArthur, the Supreme
Commander, was fired by President Truman without a vote of the
allies. In short, Keenan's Project K presidential orders were as authoritative and strong, I believe, as those of General MacArthur.
The odds are that the General would gladly have had us operate independently, as a civilian international unit of the nations
concerned, so long as we presented the occupation with no serious
problems. It certainly would not have deprived him of his rightful
place in Military history.
After the move to Hattori House, John Darsey, who had not
been invited to live there, was brutally stripped of his authority as
Keenan's Deputy and reduced to being one of the "outsiders." It
was Keenan's good fortune that Darsey humbly and generously
stayed in Tokyo despite his humiliation by Keenan. At key points
in the Tokyo process, Darsey came up with well-organized plans
for the indictment, the trial plan, and even Keenan's own opening
address. Carlisle Higgins, who succeeded Darsey as the Deputy
Chief of Mission, lacked that talent and welcomed the help.
Before we reached Japan, arrest orders had been issued for
some of the top Japanese leaders, so that upon our arrival there
was a rash of suicides-evidently encouraged by the Japanese police, who had been slow in taking suspects into custody. Suicide
saved honor. The fault was pointed at us, though we had no voice
in the arrest orders. This came to a critical head with the suicide of
Prince Fumimaro Konoye, a three-time Prime Minister. Whoever
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had placed Konoye on an arrest list before our arrival was doing
the United States no favor. Konoye had a proven record of friendship with the United States, and his ordered arrest violated our
instruction to stay away from the Imperial Household. Konoye's
placement on the list was getting close to the Emperor. MacArthur
had acceded to advice on December 6 to sign an arrest order for
Konoye, giving him ten days to put his affairs in order before reporting to Sugamo prison. Konoye's name was on two master lists
from the United Nations War Crimes Commission.
Keenan was troubled by the public anger at Konoye's suicide
and ordered me to gather as much information as possible about
pre-suicide events. I phoned Max Bishop, later Ambassador to
Thailand, then DCM of the Foreign Service Staff assigned to
SCAP. Mr. Bishop said that Konoye had spent the evening of December 15 with his good friends "Jimmie" and Betty Kawasaki at
their Atami Beach home. Bishop arranged for himself, John Darsey, Henry Sackett, John Fihelly, and me to visit the Kawasakis.
At the Kawasaki residence, we learned that our host, "Jimmie" Kawasaki, had attended the University of Pennsylvania, was
a close friend of Douglas Fairbanks, Jr., and observed Western
habits in his home (i.e. wearing imported leather shoes, tailored
slacks, and a sport coat). The interior furnishings were mainly
Western. His wife, Betty, was a much younger Scotch beauty, of
whom he was extremely jealous. They were generous hosts and we
talked for some hours about their friend, Konoye, who, depressed,
had told them what he later wrote in a suicide note: "It is unbearable for me to be tried in an American court as a so-called war
criminal." Early the next morning, after leaving the Kawasaki
house, Konoye had taken potassium cyanide.
We were just departing their door, convinced that here, indeed, was one top-level Japanese industrialist with our values. He
shattered that perception by saying of Konoye with a tremor of
emotion, "It wasn't the most courageous way [as in hara-kiri], but
I'm proud of him." I was shaken.
Prior to our arrival in Japan, our Ambassador George Atcheson, Jr., MacArthur's chief political advisor, reportedly had urged
the General to quickly order the round-up of prime suspects,
which had included Konoye. "They [the Japanese people] will not
resent those arrests," said Atcheson. Max Bishop disagreed. Bishop
was right. The left was out to get Hirohito. The Emperor was disturbed at news of the arrest of Konoye and Marquis Kido (Lord
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Keeper of the Privy Seal), who was also in the Royal Household.
On December 8, just hours before our plane touched down at Atsugi, the Emperor sought an audience with MacArthur to seek to
assume burden of total guilt "to the judgment of the powers you
represent, as the one to bear sole responsibility for every political
and military decision made and action taken by my people in the
conduct of the war."'" Perhaps the Emperor's intelligence apparatus had already learned that MacArthur, like ourselves, had been
warned against taking action against the Royal person of Hirohito.
The other Allied prosecutors had not yet arrived. Keenan did not
want the participation of the U.S.S.R. (and, I suspect, SCAP
agreed with Keenan). Higher authority won. In the interim, at
Hattori House, Keenan called several of us together to discuss a
unilateral trial by the United States acting alone against the top
perpetrators, at Pearl Harbor.
Tokyo was Keenan's Waterloo. He was allegedly becoming the
victim of alcohol and, more certainly, of enemies within his own
ranks (particularly Darsey), of staff fear of his terrible temper tantrums, and of undermining efforts by International prosecutors, especially those from Holland and the British Commonwealth, who
sought to save their sinking Empires' proud leadership role in
world affairs.
It was well for Keenan that he had hitched his own star to
General MacArthur's unwavering friendship. Keenan himself was
loyal to high principals, to our nation, to friends, to responsibility
as he saw it. Yet he was intransigent with opponents. Like President Truman, he believed in punishing enemies. Quite frankly, I
admired him, despite his abusive hard-driving methods of prying
extraordinary effort from all the prosecutors. There was a paucity
of documentary evidence at the time, and Keenan's disposition
had become frayed to the breaking point. All of us wondered
whether and when we could be prepared for trial. At last the pieces
fell together. The Tribunal's Charter was promulgated and the
Tribunal members named-president, Sir William Webb of Australia; Judge John P. Higgins of the United States (later resigned
and replaced by General Myron C. Cramer); Minister of Justice
I.M. Zarayanov of the U.S.S.R.; Chief Justice Shih Mei-yu of
China; law professor B.V.A. Roling of the Netherlands; Judge Ed31 ARNOLD BRACKMAN, THE OTHER NUREMBERG: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE TOKYO WAR

CRIMES TRIALS 50 (1987).
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ward Stuart McDougall of Canada; Henri Bernard of France; Lord
Patrick for Great Britain; Harvey Northcroft of New Zealand;
Radhabinod Pal of India; and Delfin Jaranilla of the Philippines
(the latter two came after the original charter was promulgated). 2
Next, the indictment was lodged with the accused as follows:
Araki, Sadao; Doihara, Kenji; Hashimoto, Kingoro; Hata,
Shunroku; Hiranuma, Baron Kiichiro; Hirota, Baron Koki;
Hoshino, Naoki; Itagaki, Seishiro; Kaya, Okinori; Kido, Marquis
Koichi; Kimura, Heitaro; Koiso, Kuniaki; Matsui, Iwane; Matsuoka, Yosuke; Minami, Jiro; Muto, Akira; Nagano, Osami; Oka,
Takasumi; Okawa, Shumei; Oshima, Hiroshi; Sato, Kenryo;
Shigemitsu, Mamoru; Shimada, Shigetaro; Shiratori, Toshio;
Suzuki, Teiichi; Togo, Shigenori; Tojo, Hideki; and Umezu,
Yoshijiro 3
The prosecution staff was like a trial-run United Nations.
Each of these nations, with their respective staffs, were presented
to the Tribunal before the indictment was lodged: Arthur S. Comyns-Carr for England and Northern Ireland; Hsiang Che-chun
for China; W.G. Frederick Borgerhoff-Mulder from The Hague;
Govinda Menon for India; Robert L. Oneto for France; Lord Alan
Mansfield for Australia; Brigadier Henry Nolan for Canada; Brigadier Ronald Quilliam for New Zealand; Congressman Pedro Lopez
for the Philippines; Minister S.A. Golunsky for the U.S.S.R.; and,
of course, Joseph Keenan for the United States.
Each of the accused was represented by counsel of his choice.
All had Japanese lawyers, and most also had American lawyers, all
paid for by the United States.
All the defendants pleaded "not guilty" to the charges in the
fifty-five count indictment on May 3, 1946.34 In the dock, "there
were four former premiers; three former foreign ministers; four former war ministers; two former navy ministers; six former generals;
two former ambassadors; three former economic and financial leaders; one nobleman-an imperial advisor; one radical theorist; one
admiral and one colonel." 35
See PICCIGALLO, supra note 1, at 11.
33 The Tokyo War Crimes Trials (InternationalMilitary Tribunal for the Far East
Nov. 1948), in 2 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1019 (Leon Friedman ed.,
1972) [hereinafter THE LAW OF WAR]; see also PICCIGALLO, supra note 1, at 14.
3'PICCIGALLO, supra note 1, at 18. Counts one through 36 were for "Crimes against
Peace," counts 37 through 52 were for "Murder," and counts 53 through 55 fell under the
title "Other Conventional War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity." Id. at 14.
32

11

BRACMAN,

supra note 31, at 83.
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There were no industrialists on trial, distinct from Nuremberg,
where industry used slave labor. Despite Soviet pressure, Austin
Hauxhurst and I (having been assigned by Mr. Keenan to study
the question) recommended against the inclusion of the industrialist (zaibatsu) category.
Chief Prosecutor Keenan delivered his 20,000-word opening
address on June 4 and left almost immediately for the United
States, leaving the early phases of the trial to several of us. While
he was gone, several of the Allied prosecutors plus Deputy Chief of
Prosecution Carlisle Higgins went to MacArthur with a petition for
Keenan's removal as Chief Prosecutor. The British Commonwealth
was hard after the job. Higgins insisted later that he was there
merely as an observer, but Keenan never forgave him.
My last statement to the Tokyo Tribunal was, "At this time, I
will turn the prosecution over to Mr. John Darsey, who is the personal representative of the Attorney General of the United States
of America." Keenan never forgave me. He considered himself to
be that representative, even though Darsey had, in fact, been
named by the Attorney General as the Justice Department's liaison to the Pacific war crimes trials. Possibly, I had stretched the
title.
Trial work was over in August 1946, and I returned home on
the Matson liner "Monterey." It was a blessed eight days to Seattle in which I had the first real rest since leaving the U.S. in 1945.
The rest was short. Thereafter, family disasters sent me job-hunting for much needed money, and I accepted the proffered appointment to try war crimes cases in Germany.
The Dachau Trials
I spent Christmas of 1946 in Heidelberg and New Year's Eve
in Nuremberg. I began trying cases at Dachau the following week.
Dachau was a far cry from the international scene at Tokyo. For
that matter, so was Nuremberg during the hearing of "Subsequent
Proceedings." 36 Nuremberg had been more selective in its choice of
prosecutors. Dachau took what the army sent-period. Judges at
Dachau were totally military-mostly active duty colonels with an
occasional general-whereas the Nuremberg Subsequent Proceedings employed U.S. civilians with judicial backgrounds. Cases at
Nuremberg were carefully selected and prepared. They fell into

" See BUSCHER,

supra note 7, at 34 and accompanying text.
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categories which, in themselves, had a public relations appeal; for
example, the Industrialists (e.g., Frederick Flick), the Jurists (remember Spencer Tracy in "Judgement at Nuremberg?"), and the
Doctor's case (in which medical experiments were highlighted). In
all there were twelve cases. Well tried!
Individual prosecutors at Dachau sometimes brought the focus
of public opinion on a particular case, especially those related to
atrocities. Most of those cases were named for the concentration
camps in which the atrocities occurred. For example, the Buchenwald, Mauthausen, Auschwitz, Dachau, Belsen, cases and others.
Except for those at Nuremberg, all U.S. cases were tried at
Dachau.
Public interest turned to Dachau when the "Bitch of Buchenwald" Ilse Koch, wife of Buchenwald's Kommendant, was tried
and tied to allegations that she had chosen persons for extermination to obtain tattooed human skin for lampshades and book covers. There were also the "Flyer Cases," in which captured Allied
airmen were tortured and killed rather than given required treatment under the Geneva Convention. For a time, the Malmedy case
took center-stage, because of the machine-gunning of surrendered
U.S. soldiers there. So did the Skorzeny case. Otto Skorzeny, a
German air hero, had rescued Mussolini in a daring operation that
made Skorzeny a household German hero. He was acquitted. The
Colonels who sat as judges on courts at Dachau were unwilling to
convict German national heroes simply because they performed
spectacular acts that may have prolonged the war.
At Dachau, there were just too many cases-literally millions
of atrocities had been committed by members of the Gestapo, SA,
SS, and others. Virtually every Nazi organization was declared to
be criminal at the original International Nuremberg trial.
In general, Dachau was administered much like the federal
district courts and U.S. Attorney's offices. Evidence gathered by
investigators was passed to attorneys, who prepared and tried
cases or recommended against trial. The pool of trial lawyers, some
military, some civilian, was categorized into investigators, assistant
attorneys, trial attorneys, and Chief Trial Lawyers.
Lawyers were more or less free to choose whether they would
prosecute or defend. As a Chief Trial Lawyer, I mostly prosecuted
and only occasionally defended. My cases ranged through virtually
all of the types described.
One example was the Wtffurt case involving a Dachau meat
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canning factory, a "detail" to which all Dachau prisoners sought
assignment as a means to escape more certain death elsewhere. Evidence indicated that the Wtilfurt factory owners tried to assure
that prison-laborers were adequately fed and housed. Other prosecutors shied away from that case (against the owners who were, in
part, charged with participating in a "Common Design" to violate
the rights and lives of unlawfully enslaved persons).
When the case was offered to me, I also had reservations. Yet I
brought the owners to trial on the grounds that they had grown fat
and rich and aided Naziism at the cost of the liberty of their labor
pool. They received mild sentences of some years imprisonment,
but "reviewing authority" at Augsburg was softer-hearted, and the
case was reversed and never retried.
Another of my cases was the SS non-commissioned custodian
in charge of the gas chambers, the rifle range for killing prisoners,
the cremation ovens, and remnant piles of clothing, human hair,
spectacles, gold from teeth, and other gruesome reminders of the
Camp's extermination purpose. He had come to realize that the
Totenkopf SS (Deathhead SS) was not what he had anticipated.
He tried to get out and ended up, as it were, on "death row" with
no escape for himself. It was either perform assigned duty or be
shot. Evidence handed to me indicated that he wrote lyrical poetry, grew roses, and played the violin.
On July 4, I gave up my holiday to interrogate him at the Gas
Chambers. He made a full and complete confession. He was the
only SS man who ever did so in all of the cases assigned to me.
They had all taken blood oaths to never reveal anything which
might incriminate the SS or fatherland. As this one talked, he
shivered and trembled in fear, insisting on "superior orders" as his
defense. I could not help feeling some pity and threw my own sport
coat over his shoulders so that we could continue. After he signed
the confession, I was duty-bound to recommend trial. Superior orders was not an acceptable defense."7 But it was too much like
shooting a fish in a barrel for me, so I arranged to have the case
reassigned and tried by other counsel, who obtained the death penalty. When he was hanged at Landsburg prison, news reports indicated that he was still insisting "superior orders"; he voiced no
11 See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Art. 7, in THE LAW OF WAR,
supra note 33 at 887 ("The official position of the defendants... shall not be considered as
freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment."); TusA & TUSA, supra note 5, at
308.
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words of remorse or sympathy for the prisoners who were gassed,
shot, or starved, nor for their surviving families.
A word about the town of Dachau, located two well-guarded
kilometers from the terrible camp which the townspeople were not
permitted to visit or even discuss. Dachau had been an idyllic artists colony before Hitler. The Donau, a Danube tributary,
originated there and sang its winding brook-like way to Austria.
Yet, there was the Wtilfurt meat factory, the prisoners, the secrecy
of ranking SS men living or visiting in the town, and the terrible
suspicion that all was not well "out there." Prison uniforms and
prison trucks and trains passed through. Still, everyone in town
claimed ignorance. Ignorance must have been desired. Years later
in 1952, when I became Tennessee State Chairman of the Crusade
for Freedom Drive to support Radio Free Europe and Radio Free
Asia, I was on a lecture tour with General Jacob Devers (some of
whose army units had taken Dachau and the concentration camp).
He had been appalled at the almost unbelievable condition of the
survivors and the piles of uncremated naked bodies. He had ordered the townspeople to be brought out and given shovels to bury
the corpses. Devers told me that the expressions on their faces indicated a lack of knowledge of what had been happening inside.
Some of the prosecutors became lazy in preparation of cases.
One such case was brought to trial by Jim Phelps, a tough and
capable Houston lawyer who had a reputation for never losing a
case. Believing he had been Audie Murphy's company grade officer, we used to say of Phelps that Murphy (America's most decorated soldier) owed at least half his medals to Phelps because facing the enemy was safer than retreating to Phelps.
Phelps had brought a hulking young German farmer to trial
for murdering an American airman whose plane had been shot
down. The German was found standing over the dead soldier,
whose head had been crushed, the farmer idly moving the soldier's
head with a fence post. The local German Chief of Police took a
statement from the youth "confessing" to the killing.
Having some knowledge of the case, I volunteered to defend.
Asked to plead to the charges and particulars, the accused said,
"Well, they go in over here [indicating one ear] and come out over
here [other ear]." The surprised court asked the charges to be read
again and asked, "Now do you understand the charges and particulars?" "Ya wohl," he answered and said, "Whoops, there they go
again."
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Disturbed, the court wanted the defense to enter a special sanity plea. The defense asked for the trial to proceed on a not guilty
plea. Reluctantly, the court agreed. Phelps introduced the "confession" for identification by the Chief of Police, and then triumphantly rested his case. Under cross-examination, it developed
that the Chief had watched the airman fall all the way to the
ground. "At what level did the parachute open," he was asked?
"Oh," he answered, "it never opened; the man landed on his head."
Not guilty! The court's president scolded both counsel.
At the end of August and in early September 1947, I defended
one other case that I normally would have preferred to prosecute.
Hartmann Lauterbacher, President of Hanover, Gauleiter of Sud
Hanover-Braunschweig, Honorary SS Lieutenant General, former
head of the Hitler Youth, was brought to trial by Major Bigelow
Boysen, who had been working secretly and mysteriously on the
case from the early days at Dachau. No one seemed to know much
of Boysen's-professional background. He had tried no other case at
Dachau as far as I could determine.
Before the trial, Boysen came to my office and announced officiously, "Donihi, you're going to be my assistant in the
Lauterbacher case." As a Chief Trial Attorney, I felt somewhat belittled, I wanted to know, "On whose orders?" and "Who the hell is
Lauterbacher?" He answered, "Leo Goodman's orders" and
"Lauterbacher is a ranking Nazi who was secretly selected by
Hitler to succeed himself." At this, I went to Trial Branch Chief
Goodman to ask why he had done this to me. He explained, "Boysen asked for your help and I told him it was okay with me if it's
okay with Donihi." Indignant at the way Boysen had presented
himself, I asked to defend Lauterbacher.
Perhaps it was Telford Taylor who unintentionally tilted the
court in Lauterbacher's favor. Boysen had brought in a witness
named Rudolf Diehls, whose villainous appearance and testimony
ill served the prosecution, despite a letter of introduction and confidence signed by General Taylor. Diehl's admissions under crossexamination made court members wonder why Taylor had not
tried Diehls at Nuremberg (Diehls, under my cross-examination
admitted a leading role in the establishment of the concentration
camps and the Gestapo). Because of Diehls' assertions about
Lauterbacher and Hitler, I asked permission to interrogate Rudolf
Hess and Count Baldur von Schirach. Hess, as Hitler's Deputy
(before his flight to Britain and voluntary surrender) and Von
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Schirach, as head of the Hitler Youth, were surely in a position to
know whether Lauterbacher had such importance with Hitler. My
request had to be addressed to the four-power Kommandatura or
the Allied Control Council, in that neither Nuremberg nor Telford
Taylor had jurisdiction over international prisoners.
Concurrence of the four powers was required before entrance
could be gained to interrogate any of the so-called "Nuremberg
seven" incarcerated in Spandau Prison, located in the U.K. sector
of Berlin. Never expecting an affirmative response, I wanted the
record to show that I had asked for the testimony, which I did by
wire to the Kommandatura, in care of the U.S. member, Colonel
Frank Howley. To my surprise, I received a phone call from Colonel Howley's legal officer instructing that I should plan to be in
Berlin on Friday, August 28, 1947, the day on which Howley would
present my request to his French, British, and Soviet counterparts.
By coincidence, this was when U.S. Military Governor General Lucius Clay was en route to Washington.
At about noon in Berlin, I was told that the request had been
"put on the table"-that is, introduced at roughly 10 a.m.-and,
under the rules, would not be acted on for 48 hours. I was instructed to be at the prison in 48 hours from the time of Howley's
action.3 8
As I had anticipated, at the prison on Sunday morning, August 30, were U.S., French, and British representatives, but no representatives from the U.S.S.R. The four powers rotated prison custody, and it was an American month. I was told that the three
powers present were not in concurrence about permitting me to
proceed without Soviet representation. Hess and Von Schirach
were each seated in temporary animal-type cages, in the vast
lobby. Chairs and tables were readied in front of each cage. I urgently desired to help establish a precedent for making the Nuremberg seven available to the outside world. I was to become the first
and the last person permitted to question them.
The agreement had been that I would not be permitted to
speak with the prisoners unless the four powers were all present.
The Soviets had said "Nyet!" I asked to speak with the U.S.S.R.
representative on the phone and told him that I could not come at
I Colonel Howley, later General Howley, had a reputation for confronting the Soviets
during the Berlin Blockade. The following year, he frequently urged, "Let's roll the tanks
down the Autobahn."
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another time, could not await Kommandatura action, and needed
to be in court the following day with or without the evidence. He
was sympathetic but adamant that the 48-hour rule did not intend
to preclude proper consideration of the request.
In desperation, I told the Soviet, "The prisoners are here in
front of me; everyone else is present and ready to proceed. I want
to apologize to you and your country for doing this without you."
Then I added, "I think you should know that one of the subjects I
hope to explore is Communism on Hitler's staff." He came at once.
I did not get into the subject-to his evident relief. The next day,
the Soviet's representative to the Kommandatura made it quite
clear that such questioning would never occur again.
The Von Schirach statement was placed in evidence by me.
Hess's affidavit was also offered to the prosecution but disdained
by Boysen, who had refused to join me at Spandau and who said it
served no useful purpose for the case. I still have it. In the end,
Lauterbacher was acquitted.
Some months earlier, I realized that I had become wearied to
my core of Camp Dachau. Working there daily, listening to the evidence was depressing. Living, as I did, in the former SS officers
quarters was just too much. I seemed to feel the presence of souls
thirsting for the truth to be told so that they could rest. Imaginary? I said that to myself but the invisible presences pressed on
my consciousness whenever I stopped working. To me, they had
become so real that I was ready to give up the job and return
home. Before I could do so, senior court members invited me to
live with them in the small and pleasant Moorbad Hotel-assigned
to Generals, the Court, and VIPs. I was the only civilian among the
fifty odd colonels and occasional general. Many of them were West
Point graduates. The experience was good for me. These were men
of integrity and, from my experience with courts in general, of
first-rate judicial temperament. Yet, even here, I seemed pursued
by legions of spooks wanting to be heard. So strong was this conviction that I determined to redouble my prosecutorial activity.
For the month through December 1947, I asked for every available
case which I could handle.
The Subsequent Proceedings
The "Subsequent Proceedings"
39

9

presided over by Brigadier

BUSCHER, supra note 7, at 31, 34; see also Frank Lawrence, The Nuremberg Princi-
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General Telford Taylor at Nuremberg, claimed to be "international," but in fact proceeded under color of international precedents and executive agreements as U.S. war crimes tribunals.
Twelve cases were tried in this manner. Several of the accused in
the twelve cases were known to me from interrogating them at
Camp Dachau. Most notable among these were Count Schwerin
von Krosigk (Case XI),40 whom I had decided not to try and who
had pleaded with those of us considering his borderline case from
the Dachau standpoint not to honor the Soviet request for his extradition. The other was Friedrick Flick (Case V),41 who asked me
at Lansburg Prison in 1947 to consider personally representing his
intended appeal. It was useless. My position with the U.S. Government precluded that. Actually, I had gone to the prison at the request of German diplomat Count Joachim von Puttkammer, who
claimed to have been convicted as a war criminal in China by a
U.S. Consulor court, a seeming irregularity. In any case, Puttkammer had Flick with him in the interrogation room and said, "Mr.
Flick says he has the plans for the rebuilding of Germany on his
cuff subject to his release." Evidently that had some truth, as Flick
was released soon after he lost his appeal to the Courts of the
United States and then became Germany's leading industrialist
and one of the world's richest men. I never saw them again.
Interestingly, it was the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of
Flick's appeal that brought U.S. court approval to the Subsequent
Proceedings.42 A fundamental question in Flick v. Johnson" was
whether the war crimes tribunal that tried Flick was a tribunal of
the United States. It was the opinion of Circuit Judge Proctor that
an inquiry into the origin of the Flick tribunal, its powers, and
jurisdiction proved that tribunal not to be a court of the United
States.44 Judge Proctor summarized:
Upon the surrender of Germany, the Four victorious Powers.
ples: A Defense for PoliticalProtesters, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 440 (1989).
40 JOHN MENDELSOHN, TRIAL BY DOCUMENT 188 (1988).
41

42

Id. at 180.
See Flick v. Johnson, 174 F.2d 983, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1949), afg 76 F. Supp. 979

(D.D.C. 1948), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 879 (1949).

Id. at 984.
Id. at 986. The tribunal was found to be an "international court [whose] ... power
and jurisdiction . . . stemmed directly from the Control Council, the supreme governing
body of Germany exercising its authority in behalf of the four Allied Powers." Id. This was
the finding despite the fact that Flick's prosecutors and judges were exclusively American
citizens employed and paid by the United States.
43

"'
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. . completed military control of the conquered land. Agreeably to
plan, the armies of each occupied a separate zone. It was agreed
that supreme authority over Germany would be exercised, on instructions from their Governments, by the Commanders in Chief,
"each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters
affecting Germany as a whole." At the same time a "Control
Council" [was] ... composed of the four Commanders in Chief, as
the supreme governing body of Germany. This plan of operation
was expressly limited to the period of occupation "while Germany
is carrying out the basic requirements of unconditional surrender." Arrangements for the subsequent period were to be "the
45
subject of a separate agreement.

Judge Proctor further reasoned that the United States President
directed the Commander in Chief of the American Armed Forces
in Germany, in the latter's capacity as Military Governor of the
American Zone of Occupation, to administer and support the policies put forth by the Control Council." This reinforced "the supreme authority with which the American Military Governor, in
' 47
his capacity as Zone Commander, was clothed by the Council.
Judge Proctor believed that if the said tribunal was not a
court of the United States, "no court of this country has power or
authority to review, affirm, set aside or annul the judgment and
'48
sentence imposed on Flick.
The majority opinion in Flick provides a comprehensive expla'5 Id. at 984 (citations omitted).
46 Id.
The American Military Governor was "clothed" with "supreme legislative, executive and judicial authority" by the Control Council. Id. at 986.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 984. Judge Proctor cited Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948). Hirota is
the appeals case arising out of the Tokyo judgment of the IMTFE, in which representatives
of Australia, Canada, China, the United Kingdom, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Russia, and the United States had tried the top Japanese War Crimes
suspects in a single trial. Hirota, 338 U.S. at 199, 207. Seven of those convicted, including
Baron Koki Hirota, had asked the United States Supreme Court to review the judgment. Id.
at 198. The issues on appeal were whether General MacArthur had exceeded his authority
and whether the Supreme Court could review the President's conduct of foreign affairs and
military power. Id. at 199-200. Answering in the negative, the Court held that "the tribunal
sentencing these petitioners was not a tribunal of the United States ... [and] . . . [u]nder
the... circumstances the courts of the United States have no power or authority to review,
affirm, set aside or annul the judgments and sentences imposed on these petitioners. Id. at
198. The pertinent point was made on December 16, 1948: as the Supreme Court was hearing argument, Justice William 0. Douglas is quoted as asking the Solicitor General, "Do you
mean an American general who acts for another government as well as this one would be
beyond the reach of the Court?" BRACKMAN, supra note 31, at 399. U.S. Solicitor General
Philip B. Perlman responded, "It does in this case." Id.
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nation of the U.S. Government's justification for assuming jurisdiction not only in the Flick trial and the other eleven "Subsequent
Proceedings" but also in the "original" four-power Goering trial by
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. As the court
explained, the tribunal that tried and sentenced Flick, Military
Tribunal IV, was established under Ordinance No. 7, Military Government-Germany, promulgated pursuant to the powers of -the
Military Governor for the United States Zone of occupation and
the powers conferred upon the Zone Commander by Control Council Law No. 10." Control Council Law No. 10 had been enacted to
give effect to the London Agreement,"o and to provide a uniform
legal basis for the prosecution of war criminals other than those
dealt with by the IMT.5 ' Ordinance No. 7 provided for the establishment of military tribunals, and prescribed uniform rules and
procedures for the prosecution of cases tried before those
tribunals.5 2
The court found that "the power and jurisdiction of... [Military Tribunal IV] stemmed directly from the Control Council, the
supreme governing body of Germany, exercising its authority on
behalf of the Four Allied Powers. '5 3 The court rejected Flick's argument that the tribunals were illegal due to a conflict between the
authority granted by Law No. 10 and the London Agreement,
which required consultation with the Control Council before the
establishment of any tribunal and which Flick claimed was the sole
authority for the establishment of international courts for war
crimes trials. 4 In its rationale, the court stated that the "[London]
Agreement was without prejudice to 'the jurisdiction or the powers
of any national or occupation court established . . .in any Allied
territory or in Germany for the trial of war criminals.' 55 The
court also noted that the President's nomination of the jurists who
were designated as members of the Military Tribunal IV, and
other acts in exercise of the Executive's war powers, furnished suf4'Flick, 174 F.2d at 985.
50 In order to accomplish the United Nations goal of bringing war criminals to justice,
the London Agreement provided for "establishment 'after consultation with the Control
Council for Germany' of an International Military Tribunal for the trial of war criminals
whose offenses had no particular geographical location." Id. at 984 (emphasis in original).
1 Id. at 986.
52Id. at 985.
3 Id. at 986.
5 Id.

55Id. (quoting London Agreement, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6, 145 State Papers 1943-45).
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ficient support to the Tribunal to resolve any conflict between the
London Agreement and Control Council Law No. 10 in favor of the
latter.5 6 The tribunals, established under the authority of the Control Council, were therefore "legitimate and appropriate
instru57
ments of judicial power for the trial of war criminals.
Various arguments are put forward by competent counsel who
participated in the war crimes trials. But all of these arguments
seem to rest the case for jurisdiction on international executive
agreements or on precedents which do the same. At least one commentator has questioned the utility of executive agreements. 5 Another, Professor Harry Elmer Barnes, in a review of Professor
Colegrove's book The American Senate and World Peace,59 observed that "the Senate's treaty making power is probably the last
remaining bulwark of our national safety-even more, perhaps,
than our armed forces-and it should be fought for and maintained at all costs." 60 It was just such thinking that brought on the
post-World War II national debate over the "Bricker Amendment," 1 named for U.S. Senator John W. Bricker of Ohio. The
issue concerned the Senate's "treaty making powers" derived from
article II, section 2, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which gives
the President "power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." 2
Much of the debate centered around the United States v.
Pink6 and United States v. Belmont 4 cases. One newspaper edi" Id. at 986.
57 Id.

68 See Edwin Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53 YALE
L.J. 664, 679 (1944) (noting that utility of executive agreements is limited by "precarious"
life and durability) [hereinafter Borchard, Executive Agreement]; see also Edwin Borchard,
Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Reply, 54 YALE L.J. 616 (1945) (criticizing view
that executive agreements should replace treaties). But see Myres S. McDougal & Asher
Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executiveor PresidentialAgreements: Interchangeable
Instruments of National Policy: I, 54 YALE L.J. 181 (1945) (advocating use of simpler executive agreements over treaty-making power which requires consent of two-thirds of Senate).
'9 KENNETH W. COLEGROVE, THE AMERICAN SENATE AND WORLD PEACE 12, 22 (1944).
0

Harry Elmer Barnes, THE

01

S. REP. No. 412, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); see also

PROGRESSIVE,

Mar. 20, 1944, at 10.

GERALD GUNTHER,

CONSTITU-

206-07 (12th ed. 1991) (discussing language and history of Bricker Amendment);
Donald R. Richberg, The Bricker Amendment and the Treaty Power, 39 VA. L. REV. 753
(1953) (supporting Bricker Amendment); Philip B. Perleman, On Amending Treaty Power,
52 COLUm. L. REV. 825 (1952) (opposing Bricker Amendment).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
63 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
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torial stated that "the debate [over the Bricker amendment has]
brought to light an instance in which . . . the president of the

United States [could] make an executive agreement
with a foreign
65
power . . . [and] supersede the Constitution.

In Pink, the Soviet Insurance Commissar had nationalized the
industry in 1919 and issued extraterritorial confiscatory decrees affecting private Russian insurance companies wherever located, including the First Russian Insurance Co. established in New York
in 1907,66 where, in compliance with state law, First Russian had
deposited funds with the state superintendent of insurance to protect policyholders and creditors.6 7 In 1925, the State of New York
took possession of the company's assets, which had been marked
for creditors and policy holders.6 8 In 1933, almost immediately after the Roosevelt-Stalin executive agreement recognizing the
U.S.S.R. (known as the Litvinov Agreement), Maxim Litvinov
wrote a letter to President Roosevelt assigning those funds to the
United States to be used for settlement of U.S. claims against Russia (presumably Czarist Russia). 9 When Louis H. Pink, New
York's insurance superintendent, refused to turn over the funds to
the United States, the government sued Pink and others for the
money.70 The policyholders and creditors insisted that they possessed vested property rights in the funds pursuant to a New York
decree, and that to deprive them of such property would violate
their due process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution.

71

However, the Court held that the Litvinov Agreement, interdependent with the recognition of the Soviet government, was an
international agreement entitled to a dignity similar to that accorded a treaty as "the supreme Law of the Land.

'72

Two perti-

nent propositions decided by the Court were that "state law must
yield when it is inconsistent with, or impairs the policy or provi64 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
" United States v. Pink, CLEV. PLAIN
Editorial].
68 Pink, 315 U.S. at 210-11.
67

DEALER,

Id.

68 Id.

61 Id. at 211-12.
70 See id. at 210.
71 Id. at 226.
712Id. at 230 (quoting U.S. CONsT.art. VI, § 2).

Feb. 9, 1954, at 10 [hereinafter
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sions of, a treaty or an international compact or agreement" 3 and
"although aliens are entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendgiving full force and efment," that amendment does not 7preclude
4
Assignment.
Litvinov
the
to
fect
Commenting on the treaty power as it now exists, Senator Homer H. Ferguson of Michigan told the Senate on February 4, 1954:
Mr. President, if we were to say that a treaty is on the same
basis as the Constitution, then the president and two-thirds of
the senators voting would be able to change the Constitution.
They would be able even to repeal it. Whereas, if the people
themselves wanted to amend the Constitution or to repeal it, they
would have to follow the provisions.., that amendments may be
proposed by two-thirds of each House of Congress and shall become valid when ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures
or by convention duly called in three-fourths of the states.7 5
Senator John W. Bricker added to this comment by Senator
Ferguson: "A further danger exists, in that under the interpretation by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to as the Pink
case, the president of the United States alone can do that. '1 6
In the Pink case in 1941, Justice William 0. Douglas held that
the executive agreement prevailed over New York law and policy
with the weight of treaty and that the Fifth Amendment did not
keep the United States from prevailing over the rights of creditors
and stockholders. 77 The Douglas opinion has been used by some to
place the executive agreement on the same par of authority with
ratified treaties and has itself been generally criticized by commen71
tators on the subject.
13

Editorial, supra note 65, at 10.

74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. A second and earlier case, which later became identified with Pink, is Belmont,
301 U.S. 324 (1937), which arose in 1936 solely on a motion to dismiss, without proof of New
York law or policy, or the rights of creditors or stockholders. Id. at 331. Instead of emulating
the procedure of the two courts below and granting the motion to dismiss, the Supreme
Court remanded Belmont for additional proof of New York policy and for examination of
individual claims to the property and of the question whether the Fifth Amendment permitted public configuration by the Russian government by executive act of the President. Id. at
332. The minority, composed of Justices Stone, Brandeis, and Cardozo, joined only in saying
the motion to dismiss should have been granted. Id. at 333.
77 Pink, 315 U.S. at 228, 230.
718See Edwin Borchard, ExtraterritorialConfiscations, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 282
(1942); Note, Effect of Soviet Recognition Upon Russia Confiscatory Decrees, 151 YALE L.J.
848 (1942).
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Historically along with Pink in support of the opinions viz the
executive agreement, is United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp.79 In Curtiss-Wright, the issue was whether Congress could
validly delegate to the President the power to prohibit the sale of
arms during the Chaco War, provided the President found that
such prohibition would be an aid to peace." The Supreme Court
reversed a district court determination that the delegation, an "abdication of legislative responsibility," substituted presidential
opinion for fact-finding and was therefore unconstitutional.8 1 In
the opinion of Justice Sutherland, the President, as the "sole organ
of the federal government in the field of international relations," 82
had powers of "negotiation" into which Congress could not
intrude."3
Now, fifty-one years since the Douglas opinion, it seems improbable that presidential authority, as related to Pink, will arise
in the matter of Gulf war crimes trials. However, this writer believes the subject should be reopened by the White House and the
U.S. Senate. The international post-World War II war crimes trials
were flawed jurisdictionally (as to laws of the United States) from
their vigorous, enthusiastic inception to, and through, final adjudication in the trial tribunals followed by whatever action was taken
thereon in the courts of the United States. Nothing written herein
intends to weigh or judge the possible influence of these trials on
any system of law or precedents then in place in the jurisprudence
of our past or present Allies.
After the Trials
There is significance in the fact that, as to the Tokyo trial,
very little of consequence has been written by U.S. prosecution
participants. Certainly most of our prosecutors were competent
lawyers fully capable of completing definitive articles. Yet a pall
seemed to hang over most of the original members of the prosecution's trial team virtually from touchdown in Japan and lasting the
rest of their lives. For example, Professor Joseph English of The
Catholic University of America's School of Law has been quoted as
70

299 U.S. 304 (1934).

80 Id. at 312, 315.

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 14 F. Supp. 230, 235 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd,
299 U.S. 304 (1936).
82 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
83 Id. at 319.
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saying in the recent years of growing scholastic interest in the Tokyo case, "I've made it a policy never to comment on that trial."
His reasons have not been stated and he is not alone. Mine is an
undocumented personal opinion based on hard personal experience
with Keenan; many of the lawyers hated him. At least one
threatened violence. His verbal personal assaults on his own counsel had estranged even his best friends. In general, there was a depressed feeling at all times among those working under Keenan.
Nevertheless, three articles have come to my attention that were
written by Tokyo prosecutors. Possibly the most scholastic and significant one was Solis Horwitz's "The Tokyo Trial" for International Conciliation, published by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with a preface by Telford Taylor.84 This was the
definitive legal work from the prosecution's point of view. Mr. Taylor's remarks seem sufficiently valuable to be quoted here in full:
This valuable descriptive analysis of the Tokyo Trial should
command the attention, not only of students of the War and of
contemporary Japan, but of all international lawyers. For it is as
a milestone in the development and application of international
law that the war crimes trials will find their niche in the history
of modern times.
As the scene of the first great international trial, where many
basic principles of the jus gentium received their first judicial formulation, Nuremberg has become a synonym for war crimes trials
and has received the lion's share of attention from both journalists and jurists. Unhappily, public indifference to the Tokyo Trial
has been matched by an apparent lack of interest on the part of
the sponsoring governments themselves. Up to now, for example,
our own government has not undertaken to publish even the Tokyo Judgement, to say nothing of the testimony and other proceedings before the Tribunal.
Publication of this excellent monograph by Solis Horwitz is,
therefore, an especially welcome contribution by the Carnegie Endowment to a literature which is still shamefully sparse.8 "
Since the above was written, students and scholars (and journalists) have brought much of the Tokyo Trial materials into the
light from the hundreds of cases and boxes in archives.8 6 My own
8, See Solis Horwitz, The Tokyo Trial, INT'L CONCILIATION, Nov., 1950, at 473-584.

5 Id. at 473.
86 Important among these is the work of Dr. R. John Pritchard, of the United States,

who is a research fellow at the University of London. He compiled the entire English transcript, including more than twelve volumes of indexing. I can attest to the tenacity of Dr.
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experience with trial materials in the National Archives has convinced me that the research task for even the best of scholars is
virtually insurmountable. For example, when we at Tokyo created
the rule which permitted documents to be entered into evidence
(under the probative evidence rule) with only that significant portion which was important to the immediate issue translated, we
were creating what has become a permanent pandora's box, because the untranslated portions of the documents had subject matter frequently objected to as not proper for post-trial publication.
The result has been a State Department freeze for policy reasons
making the materials often unavailable even to those of us who
placed the documents in evidence originally.
For me, the most significant comment in Mr. Horwitz's
splendid 111-page presentation is found in the final paragraph of
his conclusion:
[A]nd to remember that in every system of law there is always the
inherent danger that the legal system might be perverted by the
aggressor for his own aggressive purposes against the very persons
whom the law was designed to protect-a danger which can be
averted only by vigilance to maintain the internal strength of the
law and the power of the law abiding.
Amidst the tensions of the new post-war conflicts the members of
the Tribunal might have succumbed to a feeling that their task
was a futile one. It is of the utmost significance that they did not
succumb, but, even under the impact of events which might foreshadow a conflict more horrible than the one just concluded, they
elected to reaffirm as an act of faith, their conviction that war was
not a necessary concomitant of international life and that acknowledged principles of law and justice were fully applicable to
nations and their leaders. Whatever may be the ultimate decision
on the merits of its judgement, perhaps the real significance of
the work of the Tokyo Tribunal lies in this act of faith.87
One might ask, "what act of faith?" and "What acknowledged
principles of whose or what law?"
In his Dissent Judgment, IMTFE Justice R.B. Pal of India
said, "I would hold that each and every one of the accused must be
found not guilty of each and every one of the charges in the indictPritchard, who phoned me many times during his London research and wrote incisive queries seeking to settle vexing questions.
" Horwitz, supra note 84, at 575.
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ment and should be acquitted of all those charges.
also wrote:

88

Justice Pal

The case of the accused before us cannot in any way be likened to
the case either of Napoleon or Hitler. The constitution of Japan
was fully working. The Sovereign, the Army and the Civil officials
all remained connected as usual and in normal ways with the society. The constitution of the State remained fashioned as before
in relation to the will of the society. The public opinion was in
full vigor. The society was not in the least deprived of any of its
means to make its will effective. These accused came into power
constitutionally and only to work the machinery provided by the
constitution. They remained all along amenable to public opinion,
and even during war, the public opinion truly and vigorously
functioned. The war that took place in the Pacific was certainly
war with Japan. THESE PERSONS DID NOT USURP ANY
POWER AND CERTAINLY WERE ONLY WORKING THE
MACHINERY OF THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED
STATE OF JAPAN AS PARTS OF THE JAPANESE FORCE
WHICH WAS AT WAR WITH THE ALLIED POWERS. 9
In 1985, the Tokyo Trials' Dutch Judge B.V.A. R6ling wrote
the introduction to An InternationalSymposium called "The Tokyo War Crimes Trial," published in Japan by Kodansha Ltd. and
cited by C. Hosoya, N. Ando, Y. Onuma, and R. Minear.90 The
nineteen panelists of this "International Symposium" were primarily revisionists. None of them represented the U.S. prosecution.
The nature of the papers published require thoughtful response,
which cannot be given here because of time and space. However,
some of the remarks of Justice RSling are important to indicate a
difference of opinion from Solis Horwitz. Mr. R6ling says, in part:
Nuremberg became more widely known throughout the world
than "Tokyo." This is quite understandable. The Nuremberg trial
began quite soon after the end of the war, and it did not last very
long. It was the first trial in which leaders of a state-among
whom were such well-known figures as Goering-stood trial not
only for crimes committed during the war but also for launching
the war itself.
Nuremberg also had more allure than the Tokyo trial. The
supra note 31, at 392.
1 BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL
PEACE 536 (1980).
88

s

"

1986).

BRACKMAN,

CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD

TOKYO WAR CRIME TRIAL-AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 16

(C. Hosoya, et al., eds.,

WAR CRIMES

1992]

reasons are clear when one compares the chief prosecutors and
the presidents, the person who, for the general public, established
the image and determined the prestige of the two trials. Robert
Jackson, the American chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, was a brilliant man who assumed his function convinced that this was one
of those rare moments in history that might yield a fundamental
change in thought and action, and who could express that deep
conviction in words reminiscent of Churchill .... 9,
Elton Hyder's "The Tokyo Trial" 92 quotes Senator Robert
Taft of Ohio in his opening paragraph. Taft said, "The Hanging of
the eleven men convicted at Nuremberg will be a blot on the
American record which we shall long regret."9 Mr. Hyder disagrees. e4 So do I.
In his closing lines, Mr. Hyder notes: "It is true that the victorious are punishing the defeated. But someone must do it. ' ' e5 In my
conversation with Attorney General Tom Clark in January 1946,
Clark said, "These [war criminals] have perpetrated almost unbelievable horror on humanity. What the hell can I do with them?"
Finally, in his very last line, Mr. Hyder writes, "[T]he court
itself is on trial." ' I agree.
The third piece written by a prosecution member was David
Nelson Sutton's "The Trial of Tokyo: The Most Important Trial in
All History? ' 97 (For me, the question mark is the most important
part of the article). Mr. Sutton's arguments are the familiar ones of
precedents. At one point, he paraphrases Mr. Justice Cardozo: "International law.like our own common law develops slowly." 98
CONCLUSION

The weaknesses of the original four-power trial may have left
the world with Nuremberg's defects. Nevertheless, with a judicial
record-albeit far short of an enforceable precedent-which at
least provides something of a beginning for future international
war crimes trials to build upon, Nuremberg provides a foundation
1
92

Id.
Elton M. Hyder, Jr., The Tokyo Trial, 10 TEX. B.J. 136, 136 (Apr. 1947).

o Id. at 136.
,Id.
" Id.
at 167.
96 Id.
' David Nelson Sutton, The Trial of Tojo: The Most Important Trial in All History?,
36 A.B.A. J. 93 (1950).
18 Id. at 165 (quoting New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 383 (1934)).
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against the next generation of Hitlers (Saddam Hussein, for
example).
But the twelve Subsequent Proceedings9 9 prosecuted by General Telford Taylor 0 0 are another matter, if anything, detracting
from, rather than ennobling, the original Nuremberg case. Justice
Jackson seems to have been the author, though it is not clear that
the idea was his alone. 10 He stood alone against the other Nuremberg allies-Great Britain, France and the USSR-all of whom
"went home" after the original trial. While the other allies conducted their own subsequent war crimes trials within their "zones"
of occupation, 10 2 it seems that none of them made an effort to continue, as at Nuremberg, under the cloak or color of international
law. As did the United States. In reality, the Taylor twelve were,
regardless of the legalese used, wholly U.S. courts operated under
the assumed authority of the U.S. Army and not "international" in
any traditional sense. General Taylor himself has even suggested
the possible use of these "precedents" as the basis for the trial of
U.S. citizens from Lieutenant Calley through the Commander-inChief. 10
In my opinion, a worse condition resulted from the twelve
Subsequent Proceedings. A habit had been formed that permitted
executive abuse of power to the exclusion of the powers of Congress. On the heels of the Subsequent Proceedings came unrelated
policy differences with the U.S.S.R. resulting in the establishment
of a tripartite allied organization (U.S., Great Britain, France), re11

See supra notes 39-62 (discussing the Subsequent Proceedings at Nuremberg).

,..
As this Essay goes to print, I have had the opportunity to read Telford Taylor's
recent book, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials:A PersonalMemoir (1992). William L.
Shirer capsulates my opinion of Telford Taylor's book when he says:
Telford Taylor has written the inside story of the Nuremberg Trials. As one of the
Chief American prosecutors he knows the ins and outs of the tangled proceedings.
He has told a fascinating story very well and very fairly. His book is a unique
contribution to history-and a moving personal memoir.
TAYLOR, supra note 7, at back page of jacket. That, however, changes nothing pertaining to
the basic principles discussed in this article.
10I See Lawrence, supra note 10, at 411. "Representatives of the United States government, such as President Harry Truman and Supreme Court Justice Jackson, indicated that
the participants in the Nuremberg Trials, including the United States, intended the Principles to be universally applicable." Id.
102

See

WERNER MASER, NUREMBERG,

A

NATION ON TRIAL

33 (Richard Barry trans.,

1979).
"0s TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 55. See generally Lawrence, supra note 10, at 412 (citing
legal proceedings following massacre at Mylai, particularly, conviction of Lt. Calley, as evidence of acceptance of application of Nuremberg Principles).
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placing in most parts the quadripartite Allied Military Government,10 4 though not affecting the quadripartite imprisonment of
the Spandau Seven. In 1949, under this new tri-power organization, U.S. Army General Lucius Clay, Commander of the U.S.
forces in Germany, under the guise of his "civilian" hat as the U.S.
Military Governor for Germany, established a system of "Military
Government Courts" for Germany'0 5 which were not submitted for
approval to the Congress. 0 6 Some four years later and after
thousands of cases (some of which involved U.S. citizens entitled
to court martial trials as their "due process of law"), the Supreme
Court gave this court system constitutional approval. 0 7 Justice
Black's dissent in that case, Madsen v. Kinsella,08 describes my
own attitudes. He wrote:
Petitioner, a United States citizen, is now serving a fifteen year
sentence for murdering her husband. At the time of the alleged
crime, she was living in the United States Area of Control in Germany with her husband who was an Air Force lieutenant on active duty in Germany. It appears that the court that tried her and
the law she was judged by were not established or authorized by
Congress. Executive officers acting under presidential authority
created the system of courts that tried her, promulgated the
edicts she was convicted of violating, and appointed the judges
who took away her liberty.
The very first Article of the Constitution begins by saying
that 'All legislative Powers herein granted shall be yested in a
Congress' and no part of the Constitution contains a provision
specifically authorizing the President to create courts to try
American citizens. Whatever may be the scope of the President's
power as Commander-in-Chief of the fighting armed forces, I
think that if American citizens in present-day Germany are to be
tried by the American Government, they should be tried under
laws passed by Congress and in courts created by Congress under
10 9
its constitutional authority.

It could be coincidental that as General Taylor's staff vacated
the Nuremberg Palace of Justice, the "Court of Appeals" (the top
'" See SMITH, supra note 2, at 3-4; see also TUSA, supra note 5, at 9.

05 See generally Robert M. Donihi, Occupation Justice, 1 S. TEx. L. J. 334 (1955).
See Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 371-72 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). "It ap-
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pears that the court that tried her [was] not established or authorized." Id.
107

Id. at 362.

343 U.S. 341 (1952).
,09 Id. at 371-72.
1Os
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tribunal of the new system) moved in. Shortly thereafter, a vast
network of courts was set up in U.S. occupied Germany, which became the subject of the Madsen case.110 Eventually, the chief judge
was fired and the court system folded. 1 ' However, the "precedent"
of Madsen remains.
That was not to be the end of these courts that described
themselves as "neither civilian nor military."' 12
When the case of Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr., accused
and later convicted of murdering at least twenty-two Vietnamese
people in 1968 in the village of Mylai,1" 5 suddenly confronted the
American conscience,1 14 General Taylor was widely quoted as to
the possible applicability of the "Nuremberg Precedent." In addition, the Pentagon issued press statements that Calley could be
tried in the U.S. by the court system approved in Madsen." 5 Fortunately, President Nixon approved trial by court martial." 6 The
rest is history. But who can say the Madsen precedent will not one
day be used against U.S. citizens in much the same way that General Taylor seems to recommend for the Nuremberg Precedent.
It is relevant here to comment on the grave implications of
United States Supreme Court approval of executive agreements in
lieu of treaties. The Senate's treaty making power indeed may be
this nation's last remaining legislative bulwark against tyranny of
the kind against which the Nuremberg Precedent(s) were intended
to defend."'
All is not rain and darkness. On October 6, 1992, the United
Nations Security Council, "in a further effort to halt atrocities in
the former Yugoslav republics,"'"" unanimously adopted a resolu110See Donihi, supra note 105, at 334.
See generally Donihi, supra note 105.
1 See Madsen, 343 U.S. at 358. "[T]he number of civilians affected...

and the need

for establishing confidence in civilian procedure emphasized the propriety of tribunals of a
non-military character. With this purpose, the Military Government Courts of Germany...
have had less military character than that of courts-martial." Id.
Calley v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650, 650 (M.D. Ga. 1974), rev'd, 519 F.2d 184 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976). See generally TAYLOR, supra note 24.
1" Calley, 382 F. Supp. at 657. "Never in the history of the military justice system, and
perhaps, in the history of American courts, has any accused ever encountered such intense
and continuous prejudicial publicity as [Calley]."
11 Calley, 382 F. Supp. at 696.
e Calley, 382 F. Supp. at 696. There was testimony that newspapers and magazines
quoted the President, after he was told about Calley being charged, as saying: "That's fine,
that's alright with me." Id.
"' See supra notes 58-60.
"
Trevor Rowe, U.N. Resolution Could Lead to Yugoslav War-Crimes Trials, WASH.
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tion" that "might ultimately lead to the creation of a war-crimes
tribunal.""" Commentators have stated, however, that the resolution "stops short of making an explicit recommendation for a Nuremberg-style mechanism." Rather, it calls for a "commission of
experts" to examine and analyze evidence of war crimes "with a
view to providing the Secretary General [Boutros Boutros-Ghali]
with its conclusions on the evidence of grave breaches of... international humanitarian law,"'12 0 who could then recommend "further appropriate steps.' 12 1 Perhaps it is because John McCloy impressed me so greatly with the comment that "cynicism is the
cardinal sin" that I am optimistic. Is the world now looking to a
selfless time when men will establish an international war crimes
tribunal with enforcement ability? Our own Acting Secretary of
State Lawrence Eagleburger is reported to be "more skeptical," allegedly pointing out "that the Serb promise was an attempt to
head off the U.N. resolution.' 1 22 Eagleburger is quoted as saying,
"It's so fuzzy that you can't be particularly certain of how serious
they [the Serbs] are."'1 2 3 It appears from these recent developments
that an international war crimes tribunal is slowly edging our way
but even if it was walking, it should be here by now.
Recent developments illustrate the need for such a tribunal,
for example, the slaughter of muslims in Bosnia; 24 suggestions
that economic needs of the former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan
may force it to sell nuclear arms to Iran; 12 the Japanese Emperor's
recent refusal to "apologize" for World War II war crimes committed by Japan; 12 6 Japan's recent admission that it ran army brothels
(enslaving "comfort women" from Korea and elsewhere in the PaPOST, Oct. 7, 1992, at A-27.
1 Id. (discussing U.N.S.C. Res. 780 On Bosnia-Herzegovina, Oct. 12, 1992, 75 U.N.T.S.
Nos. 970-973).
120 U.N.S.C. Res. 780, at § 2.
221
222
223
124

Id. § 3.
Rowe, supra note 118, at A-27.
Id. (alteration in original).
See Lally Weymouth, Bosnia: The Case for U.S. Action, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1992,

at A23.
120

Rowland Evans & Robert Novak, Nuclear Warheads for Iran?,WASH. POST, Oct. 12,

1992, at A23.
"2I See Abi Sekimitsu, Japan's Emperor Avoids Apology for World War II, WASH.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 1992, at A6 (discussing emperor's failure to give sought after apology during

visit to China); Lena H. Sun, Emperor Regrets War Acts in China, WASH. POST, Oct. 24,
1992, at A13.
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cific) during World War 11.1217 Today, I received a handwritten post
card from Seoul signed by Hsian-li Tan who videotaped the entire
proceedings of the Gulf War Symposium at St. John's. She writes,
I am in Seoul videotaping at the memorial ceremony for the Korean "Comfort Women" of WWII. I will also interview some of
the "comfort women" survivors. Japan is not well liked here, to
say the least. Every Wednesday for the past several months there
is a demonstration in front of the Japanese Embassy.
Finally, some conclusions regarding Japan and the absence of
Emperor Hirohito from the dock. 2 8 It will be recalled that a condition of "non-aggression" existed between Japan and the U.S.S.R.
until President Truman told Stalin of the Atomic Bomb-after
which Stalin quickly moved his armies into China and Manchuria
then declared war on Japan and subsequently captured and kept
Japanese forces in captured China. There was a lengthy delay
before it was decided not to indict the Emperor. The U.S.S.R.
wanted Hirohito tried, as did others of the prosecution.' 2 9 The serious hold-out was the Soviets, who finally caved in, 3 0 I believe, due
to a lack of support on the mainland and from the U.S. for Chiang
Kai-shek. President Truman was unable to make the decision
without concurrence of the Pacific Allies associated in the prosecution. But none of them had much to lose if the Japanese people
decided to fight to the very end to save their Shinto-God from humiliation and trial.'' It was the U.S. that occupied Japan, 32 not
the others and certainly the Soviet troops were not desired.'
Anyhow, Hirohito was not tried. Nor was Saddam Hussein.
Those too are precedents.
Future generations of scholars will continue to agree and disagree with the concept of applying the "Nuremberg Principle" to
trials of American leaders, in American courts, for acts committed
by subordinates. Further, there will always be a shadow on American jurisprudence as long as unilateral application of that Prece127 David E. Sanger, Japan Admits It Ran Army Brothels During War, N.Y. Tiars,
July 7, 1992, at Al.
128 See PICCIGALLO, supra note 1, at 16.
129

Id. at 16.

Id. at 17. "Ostensibly, Allied leaders recognized and accepted this reality," although
it took three years for this to come to light. Id.
"'

...Id. at 17.
132 Id. at 147.
223

"Despite diehard determination to fight to the bitter end, Japanese armed forces

unquestioningly obeyed Hirohito's surrender proclamation on August 14, 1945." Id. at 210.
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dent stands constitutional per the Flick case and all the "Subsequent Proceedings" relating to Flick.
It seems unlikely that other nations plan to use the Nuremberg Precedent against their own leadership. China? Russia might
use the Precedent against leaders of some former U.S.S.R. breakaway states, if the communists ever regain control. Would Israel
apply the Precendent to her own leaders? How about the Arab
states? Iran? It is safe to say that there is less enthusiasm for the
domestic application of the "Nuremberg Principle" elsewhere than
in the U.S.A. if, indeed, there is enthusiasm for it here.

